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Abstract
We analyze the evolution of culture when parents socialize children to the cul-
tural variants that maximize child lifetime utility. Parents invest in cultural trans-
mission taking into account that children are also influenced by peers. We model
the influence of peers by assuming that children observe diﬀerent cultural variants
in their peer group, assign merit to them and adopt one variant, following a prob-
abilistic adoption rule. We show that cultural diversity is sustainable even if all
parents strive to transmit the same variant. We also show that a parental demand
for cultural pluralism does not guarantee cultural diversity.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification codes: D10, I20, J13.
Keywords: Cultural transmission, cultural diversity, peer groups, oblique transmis-
sion.
I. Introduction
The study of cultural transmission is motivated by the evidence of slow cultural con-
vergence and persistence of cultural diversity, reported in Glazer and Moynihan (1963)
and Borjas (1995). The evidence contradicts the predictions of rapid convergence and
assimilation of cultures common to the early sociological theories that described Ameri-
can society as a melting pot. Recent economic models of cultural transmission give one
account of why cultures remain diverse.1 Bisin and Verdier (2000) argue that "the per-
sistence of cultural traits, ..., is the consequence of the demand for “cultural pluralism”
on the part of ethnic, religious, and racial minorities."
This conclusion, however, is at odds with a number of observations. For instance, it
is hard to attribute events such as the suburban riots in France in the fall of 2005 or the
surge of religious fundamentalism among some groups of second generation immigrants,
to an active endeavor of parents to transmit their own variants. Many negative social
phenomena involve children and adolescents whose parents have tried hard, and often
∗We thank Alberto Bisin, Yves Zenou and Fabrizio Zilibotti for helpful comments. Financial support
from Vetenskapsrådet is gratefully acknowledged.
1See Bisin and Verdier (2006) for a recent survey of the literature.
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succeeded in becoming well-integrated in society. There are also plenty of examples of
parents who strive in vain to preserve elements of cultural identity or pluralism, such as
minority dialects or customs. A common root of the parental failure to preserve diversity
is the fact that children rather learn from their peers than from their parents. For instance,
Harris (1998) argues that it is the aim of children and adolescents to fit in and be successful
in their peer group. Thus, limiting parents’ influence on the socialization process (see also
Pinker, 2002). Also the economic literature on identity formation focuses on the young
individuals adoption of values and behavior in order to be successful children rather than
on the inter-generational transmission of culture and values from parents to children
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000 and 2002).
The purpose of this paper is to formulate a model of cultural transmission which
recognizes that children have a role in adopting culture, and which does not rest on
parental demand for pluralism as an explanation for diversity. We do so in a model
similar to Bisin and Verdier (2000) and Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002) in which altruistic
parents transmit cultural traits and values to their children (vertical transmission), taking
into account that children are also influenced by the society in which thy live(oblique
transmission).2
Our main theoretical contribution is to formalize the merit guided learning on the
part of children described by Boyd and Richerson (1985). In particular, we assume that
children observe diﬀerent cultural variants in their peer group, assign merit to the variants
and adopt one of them following a probabilistic adoption rule which depends on relative
merits. This learning process gives rise to a general oblique transmission function which
allows for transmission to be biased in favor of some traits.
The standard case discussed in the cultural transmission literature, which assumes
that the probability of acquiring a variant equals its proportion in the population (linear
or unbiased oblique transmission), is encompassed by our model as a special case. Linear
transmission results if children assign equal and constant merit to all the variants of a
trait or if children have only one randomly drawn peer, which is in fact the maintained
assumption in the previous literature. However, we show that any departure from these
assumptions results in some form of biased (non-linear) transmission.
In particular, under the reasonable assumption that children learn from a larger group
of randomly drawn peers, our model can generate the positive, negative and frequency
dependent (or conformism) biases that were already discussed in the cultural anthropology
literature (see, e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 1985).3
While previous models of cultural transmission have assumed demand for pluralism, a
2Oblique transmission is distinguished from vertical transmission which captures transmission of cul-
ture form parents to children. Horizontal transmission, is the transmission of culture from individuals of
the same generation. This terminology was first introduced by Cavalli Sforza and Feldman (1981).
3Conformism is not new to economics. It has been show to arise when rational agents use the decisions
and behaviors of others as sources of information about the qualities and of a good or the virtues of a
trait, Becker (1991), Banerjee (1992), and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992). Conformism can
also result when agents value status in a group, Bernheim (1994) and Becker and Murphy (2002) or
because of mutual externalities from coordination.
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further contribution of this paper is to provide a model which enables the study cultural
dynamics when parents agree on which cultural variant is desirable. This is important.
Although there are obvious examples where parents actively promote their own variant,
e.g. language and religion, this is far less obvious when it comes to traits and values
associated with low status and poor market outcomes.4
Biased oblique transmission has diﬀerent implications for the evolution of culture
compared to linear transmission. In particular, we find that biases open up for multiple
stable equilibria such that initial conditions regarding the prevalence of cultural variants,
may determine whether there will be assimilation or diversity in the long run.
Contrary to previous models, our theory can explain why some variants become ex-
tinct, even though parents are willing to actively promote them. In particular, extinction
may occur if children are conformist and the fraction of holders is small enough. To the
extent that some elements of cultural diversity are valued in society, our theory justifies
policy intervention in defense of minoritarian traits and cultures. Our theory also shows
that the survival of sub-cultures that are regarded as a burden to society, e.g. crimi-
nality or religious fundamentalism, does not hinge on active investments of parents nor
on the demand of cultural pluralism. The key may again be the nature of the learning
and socialization process. Even a variant that no parent promotes may persist if children
are positively biased in favor of it, or if they are conformist and their environment is
dominated by the variant. Therefore, policies aimed at combating degenerate social phe-
nomena and at promoting children’s adoption of mainstream variants (e.g., "Head Start")
need not imply a conflict with parental preferences as was implicit in the conclusion of
previous theories.
The paper is organized as follows. First we present a general framework of cultural
transmission where parents can chose to promote the adoption of either of two variants of
a cultural trait. Second, we develop a model of merit guided oblique transmission with the
aim of capturing the young individuals’ adoption of cultural traits from their older peers.
Third, we derive the implications for optimal vertical transmission of diﬀerent biases in
the oblique transmission. Section four characterizes the cultural dynamics and discusses
some comparative statics. Section five concludes.
II. Cultural transmission
This section considers how young agents come to adopt cultural traits that later in
life influence adult behavior and success. We assume that socialization takes place in
childhood in the family through vertical transmission, and in society through oblique
transmission. In the period after, children reach adulthood and it is from that period
on that cultural values and traits adopted in childhood are important determinants of
wellbeing.
Parents are altruistic and willing to spend resources and nurturing eﬀorts in order
to maximize their children’s future wellbeing. We consider both the case when parents
4However, not even language and religion are neutral with respect to economic success. See Gruber
(2005). A growing empirical literature is also showing that given names are social markers with economic
consequences, e.g. Fryer and Levitt (2004).
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socialize their children to their own cultural variant and the case when parents invest in
cultural variants diﬀerent from their own. For instance, overweight parents may try to
induce children not to adopt their own unhealthy eating habits and disorganized parents
may try to get their child to keep his room tidy.
Assume a trait with two cultural variants, a and b. While children are born naive
and malleable, adults remain of the same type through the rest of their life time, once
they have been socialized to either of the variants. More formally, parents, as in Bisin
and Verdier (2001), choose the probability, τ i ≥ 0, that the child learns the i-variant
through vertical transmission. If the parent fails in influencing his child (this happens
with probability (1− τ i)), the child can still be socialized to the i-variant of the trait by
society through a process of oblique transmission.
Let q ≥ 0 be the proportion adults (socialized agents) holding the a-variant. The
remainder are of type b. Consider a parent trying to transmit the a-variant. If the parent
exerts eﬀort τa ≥ 0, the total probability that the child adopts a is given by:
x(τa, q) = τa + (1− τa)f(q), (1)
where f(q) captures the process of oblique transmission by which the "naive" child is
influenced by society (peers). Note that in all previous economic models of cultural
transmission the oblique transmission is linear, f(q) = q (Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Hauk
and Sáez-Martí, 2002; Sáez-Martí and Zenou, 2005).
A parent who instead wants to promote the b-variant will choose τ b ≥ 0. Then the
child can only adopt the a-variant as a result of oblique transmission:
x(τ b, q) = (1− τ b)f(q). (2)
Note that when promoting the a-variant, parents can increase the probability that the
child adopts the a-variant beyond what would be the case if the child was exposed only
to peers, while the child of a parent promoting the b-variant will necessarily adopt the
a-variant with smaller probability: x(τ b, q) ≤ f(q) ≤ x(τa, q).
We assume that the oblique transmission function f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a twice con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable, increasing function with f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1 and with at most
one qˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that f(qˆ) = qˆ. In the next section we discuss its microfoundations in
detail, but before that, let us consider the nurturing costs of parents.
Active nurturing is a costly undertaking. We denote by ci(τ) the cost born by a
parent who chooses nurturing eﬀort τ to transmit variant i ∈ {a, b}. We assume that
ci : [0, 1] → R+ is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and convex with ci(0) = 0, c0i(0) = 0,
c0i(τ)/c00i (τ) < 1 and limτ→1 ci(τ) = +∞. The later assumption guarantees that no parent
completely determines the variant of his child. We assume that the cost of transmitting
a particular variant is equal across parental types.5
5It is straightforward to generalize the analysis and assume that costs diﬀers across type of parents.
For instance that costs could be higher when transmitting the "other" variant. The results would not
change qualitatively.
4
Since the parent’s choice of τa (or τ b) uniquely determines the probability x that the
child adopts the a-variant of the trait, we can, using (1) and (2), solve for τ b and τa and
write the nurturing cost directly as a function of the probability of adopting the a-variant,
x (instead of τ b and τa):
C(x, q) =
½
ca((x− f(q))(1− f(q))−1) if x ≥ f(q)
cb((f(q)− x)f(q)−1) if x ≤ f(q).
(3)
The assumptions imposed on ci(τ) imply that C(f(q), q) = 0, limx→0C(x, q) = +∞ for
all q ∈ (0, 1] and limx→1C(x, q) = +∞ for all q ∈ [0, 1).
Parents care about the child’s wellbeing in adulthood. We denote by V ij the utility
a parent of type i attaches to nurturing a child of type j. It is not the purpose of
this paper to model the determination of V ij. However, what is important is that the
cultural variant adopted by the child is expected to aﬀect the child’s wellbeing in adult
life and that parents care about this. Hence, we will make no assumptions regarding the
relative magnitudes of the V ij’s. Instead we will consider two possibilities, either parental
preferences are homogenous in the sense that the sign of the diﬀerence V ia − V ib is the
same for parents i and j. We call this case melting pot alluding to the general idea behind
the melting pot theories that parents were all striving for a common American Dream.
The other possibility is that parents disagree: We call this demand for pluralism when
V ba − V bb < 0 < V aa − V ab.
In their nurturing eﬀorts, i-type parents choose the probability x ∈ [0, 1] that the
child acquires the a-variant by maximizing the expected value of oﬀspring wellbeing net
of nurturing costs:
max
x∈[0,1]
(xV ia + (1− x)V ib)− C(x, q). (4)
Before we go on to characterize the optimal nurturing eﬀorts of a− and b−type parents,
we explore the determinants of the process of oblique transmission function f(q). It is clear
from (3) that this process is crucial for the eﬀective costs of nurturing.
III. Peers and oblique transmission
We assume that the process of oblique transmission through which the young agent
adopts cultural traits from society is the result of interaction with a group of peers (role
models) of a given size G. This peer group consists of already socialized individuals.
For analytic simplicity we assume that the peers are randomly selected from the whole
population.6 Peer group interaction allows us to model the agents adoption of culture as
the result of an evaluation of the relative merit of the variants of traits, observed in his
peers, by the young agent.
In contrast, the standard assumption of previous economic models of cultural trans-
mission has been that the young agent is randomly matched to one role-model from whom
the variant is copied. This process gives rise to an unbiased oblique transmission function,
f(q) = q, and implies that children adopt each of the variants with a probability equal to
6Assuming that the peers are selected from a sub-population of slightly older agents who were recently
socialized, yields the same qualitative results. See Hauk and Sáez-Martí (2002).
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their proportion in the community. However, as discussed in Boyd and Richerson (1985),
oblique transmission need not be unbiased, in particular if young agents adopt cultural
traits based on some form of evaluation of their merits.
There are three qualitatively diﬀerent biases discussed in the sociobiological literature,
positive, negative and frequency-dependent bias.
Positive bias: The probability that the naive individual acquires variant a is always
greater than if he had selected a model at random, f(q) > q ∀q ∈ (0, 1) (see Figure
1, i)).
Negative bias: The probability that the naive individual acquires variant a is always
smaller than if he had selected a model at random, f(q) < q ∀q ∈ (0, 1) (see Figure
1, ii)).
Conformism or frequency-dependent bias: When the frequency of variant a in the
community is greater (smaller) than qˆ, the probability that a naive individual ac-
quires a is increased (decreased) relative to the unbiased transmission, f(q) T q for
q T qˆ. "Pure" conformism corresponds to qˆ = 1/2.(see Figure 1, iii))
q
fHqL iL
q
fHqL iiL
q
fHqL iiiL
Figure 1: i) positive bias, ii) negative bias and iii) frequency dependent bias.
In order to provide microfoundations for biased transmission, we introduce the notion
of “merit”, as an attempt to capture how children view and copy traits from peers in order
to be "successful" children and fit in. This aim on the part of children and adolescents is
extensively discussed in Harris (1998), and in Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002).
More precisely, we assume that after observing the cultural variants of his peers, the
naive agent assigns merit to the diﬀerent variants and follows a probabilistic rule where
the probability of adopting a variant is given by its relative merit in the peer group. More
specifically, assume that young agents assign merit mi(n,G) to trait i, where n ≤ G is the
number of i-type peers. As discussed in the introduction, this merit may depend on some
form of predisposition, be inferred by a process of experimentation or from the "success"
or salience of some peer(s) holding the trait. This inferred merit may also depend on the
proportion, n/G, of peers holding the trait.7 Let
mi(n,G) = m¯i + k g(
n
G
) i = a, b (5)
7This would be rational if it was the case that evolutionary forces had acted so as to increase the
frequency of better variants.
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where m¯i and k are non-negative constants, g(0) = 0, g(1) = 1 and g( nG) < g(
n+1
G ). If
k = 0, merit is constant and independent of frequency.
Denote by P (i|n,G) the conditional adoption probability, i.e. the probability with
which the young agent adopts trait i when n agents among the G peers are of type i.
Assumption 1: The conditional probability of adopting the a-variant of the trait is
given by the sum of the merit of the a-type peers relative to the total merit in the peer
group:
P (a|n,G) = n ma(n,G)
n ma(n,G) + (G− n) mb(G− n,G)
. (6)
It follows from this assumption that the naive agent can only adopt variants that are
represented in the peer group and that the probability of adoption of a variant increases
with the number of peers who hold the variant.
Assumption 2: The oblique transmission function f(q) is the unconditional proba-
bility with which the child adopts the a-variant,
f(q) =
GX
n=0
µ
G
n
¶
qn(1− q)G−nP (a|n,G). (7)
Assumption 2 states that the oblique transmission process results from merit based adop-
tion of traits (Assumption 1) from a randomly selected peer group of size G. It will prove
useful to derive some implications of the properties of the conditional adoption probability
for the oblique transmission function f(q).
Lemma 1 f(q) = q for all q iﬀ P (a|n,G) = nG for all n = 0, 1..., G.
Proof. See Appendix
It is clear from Lemma 1 that if the agent has only one role model, G = 1, the only
possible transmission function is unbiased. If G > 1, linear or unbiased transmission,
f(q) = q, requires very strong conditions on P (a|n,G). It is also worth noting that, any
degenerate conditional adoption probability i.e. P (a|n,G) ∈ {0, 1} ∀n will give rise to
non-linear transmission. Examples of such degenerate adoption rules are to follow the
majority or to adopt the trait held by the most successful peers.
Proposition 1 shows, however, that a probabilistic, (non-degenerate) conditional adop-
tion function as proposed in (6), allows us to generate all four transmission functions
depicted in Figure 1. In addition, we can also generate a biased frequency dependent
transmission function.
Proposition 1 Under assumptions 1 and 2, the oblique transmission function is
(i) unbiased iﬀ k = 0 and m¯a = m¯b.
(ii) positively biased iﬀ m¯a − m¯b > k(g(G−1G )− g(
1
G)).
(iii) negatively biased iﬀ m¯a − m¯b < k(g( 1G)− g(
G−1
G )).
(iv) conformist iﬀ k > 0 , |m¯a − m¯b| < k(g(G−1G )− g( 1G)) and ma(G− 1, G) < mb(1, G).
When m¯a = m¯b , the transmission is purely conformist.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Unless merits are equal and independent of frequency, i.e., k = 0 and m¯a = m¯b, (6)
cannot generate unbiased transmission. This is the case because f(q) = q (Lemma 1, (i))
requires that P (a|n,G) = n/G. Constant, but non equal merits always generate positive
(negative bias) when m¯a > m¯b (m¯a < m¯b). It is worth noting that conformism in the
oblique transmission arises only when the magnitude of the diﬀerence in the constant
part of merits of variants is not too large relative to the importance given to frequency,
k. Conformism only arises if the young agent cares about frequency and perceives the
diﬀerent cultural variants as rather similar, i.e.; |m¯a − m¯b| is small. As the diﬀerence
in merits grows larger, the transmission goes from being frequency dependent, to being
biased. Figure 2 illustrates three diﬀerent transmission functions which diﬀer in the
strength of the negative bias, keeping k constant. The solid line satisfies the restrictions
in iii) and the negative bias dominates for all q. The dashed and the dotted line illustrate
case iv) as the bias is reduced the function becomes frequency dependent. Note that with
a weaker negative bias (dashed line), qˆ is smaller.
q
fHqL
Figure 2: Changes in f due to changes in the negative bias.
IV. The dynamics of culture
We now return to the parent’s problem, which was to choose x, the probability that
the child adopts the a-variant, in order to maximize expected value of nurturing eﬀorts
net of costs (4). The first order condition (for an interior solution) is:
V ia − V ib = Cx(x, q) i = a, b. (8)
Let x(q,∆V i) be the solution to (4) where ∆V i = V ia − V ib. Lemma 2 characterizes this
optimal socialization probability under diﬀerent assumptions regarding which type of the
trait gives the highest wellbeing for the child.
Lemma 2 Assume that Cxq(x, q) < 0, for all x then
(i) If ∆V i > 0, x(q,∆V i) is increasing in q and ∆V i, f(q) < x(q,∆V i) < 1 for all q < 1,
and x(1,∆V i) = f(1).
(ii) If ∆V i < 0, x(q,∆V i) is increasing in q and decreasing in ∆V i, 0 < x(q,∆V i) < f(q)
for all q > 0, and x(0,∆V i) = f(0).
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Proof. See Appendix.
It is worth noting that the optimal eﬀort put forth by parents, τ i, is decreasing in
the proportion of the population having the trait parents are trying to promote.8 In the
next section we will explore the consequences of non-linear oblique transmission for the
dynamics of culture with a particular focus on when diversity is sustainable and when
cultural types disappear.
We follow Hauk and Sáez-Martí (2002) and assume a Poisson process for births and
deaths, holding the population size constant. Let λ be the probability that an adult
survives from one period to the next. Also, let (1 − λ) be the probability that an adult
bears a child that reaches adulthood (with certainty) a period later. Hence, each period,
a fraction (1− λ) of the adult population have just reached adulthood after having been
born and socialized in the period before. It follows that the fraction of a-variants in the
population evolves as:
qt+1 = λqt + (1− λ)(qtx(qt,∆V a) + (1− qt)x(qt,∆V b)). (9)
Eliminating time indices from (9) we can write the change in the fraction of a-types as
∆q = (1− λ)(q x(q,∆V a) + (1− q) x(q,∆V b)− q). (10)
The net inflow of a-variants in the population is hence given by a convex combination of a-
variant and b-variant parents’ optimal transmission probabilities characterized in Lemma
2, where the weights change with the population share q.
We are interested in finding conditions under which (i) the diﬀerent variants of the
trait coexist in equilibrium even if all parents agree on which type is desirable; and (ii)
when one type of the trait may disappear although parents strive to transmit their own
variant. We will refer to the idea of agreement on what variant is best for children as
(i) melting pot (∆V a = ∆V b) and to the idea that parents wish to promote their own
variant as (ii) demand for pluralism.
First, let us show that diversity is sustainable under melting pot incentives. Let q(t, q0)
denote the path induced by equation (10) when the initial condition is q0. Let E denote
the set of steady states.
Proposition 2 (Melting pot) Assume ∆V i = ∆V ≥ 0 (i=a, b) then
(i) 1 ∈ E
(ii) if oblique transmission is unbiased or positively biased (in favour of trait a) then
E = {1} and q(t, q0)→ 1 for all q0.
(iii) if oblique transmission is negatively biased (against trait a) E = {q∗, 1} with
q∗ ∈ [0, 1) and q(t, q0)→ q∗ for all q0 6= 1.
(iv) if oblique transmission is conformist and ∆V small enough then E = {q∗1, q∗2, 1},
q∗1 < q∗2, q(t, q0) → q∗1 for all q0 < q∗2and q(t, q0) → 1 for all q0 > q∗2. For large enough
∆V, E = {1} and q(t, q0)→ 1 for all q0.
8Bisin and Verdier (2000) refer to this as cultural substitution.
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Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2, shows that diversity is sustainable under melting pot incentives if the
desired trait is diﬃcult to acquire through oblique transmission. Because parents are in a
sense working uphill, the "unwillingness" of children, due to a negative bias or conformist
pressure, to acquire the desired variant prevents the undesired variant from disappearing.
In Figure 3 we illustrate the cultural dynamics under melting pot incentives when
the oblique transmission function is negatively biased and when there is conformism. We
have plotted ∆q as a function of q ∈ [0, 1]. Stable steady states are marked with filled
squares and unstable steady states with empty squares. It is easy to see that diversity
can be sustained even in a situation in which all parents promote the same cultural
variant. First, when there is a negative bias against adopting the a-variant through peer
interaction, culture will always be diverse. Second, when there is conformism, it is clear
that the economy converges either to a diversified culture with a "low" fraction of a-types,
or if there are enough a-types to start with, the b-variant disappears.
q
∆q Negative bias
q
∆q Conformism
Figure 3. Melting pot incentives with negative bias and conformism.
When children are conformist, there can be multiple stable steady states. This opens
up for the possibility of diversity or assimilation depending on initial conditions and has
interesting implications for the eﬀects of integration policies or policies attempting to
influence the merits assigned by children to diﬀerent variants of traits.
We now derive some comparative static results. Under negative and frequency depen-
dent transmission, increasing parents’ awareness of the importance of the trait (higher
∆V ) increases the equilibrium values and the basin of attraction of 1 in the conformist
case. An increase in the relative merit assigned to the a−variant has a positive eﬀect on
the equilibrium values when∆V > 0, as does an increase in the weight given to frequency,
k.
q
∆q iL
q
∆q iiL
q
∆q iiiL
Figure 4: Changes in i) negative bias with ∆V =0 ii) in negative bias with ∆V>0 iii) in ∆V ’s
with constant bias.
Assume that there is a negative bias against the a-variant of a trait and that there is a
policy intervention that reduces the negative bias, i.e. a policy reducing m¯b− m¯a. Such a
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policy could be for instance an information campaign in schools. This leads to changes in
f(q) as those depicted in Figure 2, where the dotted line corresponds to a smaller reduction
in the bias than the dashed one. As the negative bias decreases the oblique transmission
becomes more and more conformist. The corresponding cultural dynamics resulting from
such changes are represented in Figure 4 i) and ii) where the solid, dotted and dashed lines
correspond, respectively, to the to the solid, dotted and dashed transmission functions in
Figure 2. In panel i) parents do not invest in their children’s preferences (∆V = 0) while
in panel ii) both types of parents agree that a is the preferred variant (∆V > 0). Under
the negatively biased transmission (solid line), there is a unique stable steady state (at
q∗ = 0 in i) and q∗ > 0 in ii)). The change in merits increases the equilibrium proportion
of a-agents only if parents are already investing in the preferred trait (∆V > 0, panel ii)).
Influencing the children’s merit valuation when parents do not invest in the trait, as in
panel i), leaves the steady state fraction of a−agents constant at 0. As the transmission
function becomes frequency dependent there is another stable steady state at q = 1.
The only way to reach the new equilibrium is through big shocks changing the initial
proportion of a-agents. When parents make a positive investment in transmitting the
a−variant (panel ii)), reducing the negative bias of children always increases the steady
state fraction of a-agents. Moreover, if the change in the merits is large enough (dashed
line) the economy will converge to a new unique steady state with everybody having
the desired trait, i.e., q = 1. Finally, panel iii) represents the change in the dynamics
due to an increase in the parents’ evaluation of the a−variant, keeping the negative bias
constant. This policy always increases the equilibrium proportion of a-agents. The solid
line corresponds to ∆V = 0, the dotted and dashed lines to positive ∆V with the latter
being larger. This example suggests that policies may be more eﬀective if they try to
aﬀect both parents awareness of the importance of a trait and children’s relative merits.
Next we consider the cultural dynamics under the type of parental preferences that
have been analyzed in the previous literature, namely the demand for pluralism.
Proposition 3 (Demand for pluralism) Assume ∆V b < 0 < ∆V a then
(i) {0,1} ⊆ E.
(ii) if oblique transmission is unbiased E = {0, q∗, 1} and q(t, q0)→ q∗ for all q0 ∈ (0, 1).
(iii) if oblique transmission is negatively biased (against trait a) q = 1 is always unstable
and q = 0 is stable for small enough ∆V a. There may exist interior stable steady states.
(iv) if oblique transmission is positively biased (in favour of trait a) q = 0 is always
unstable and q = 1 is stable for small enough ∆V b. There may exist interior stable steady
states.
(v) if oblique transmission is conformist, 0 is stable for small enough ∆V a, 1 is stable for
small enough ∆V b. For small enough ∆V a and ∆V b there always exist a interior unstable
steady state. For large enough ∆V a and ∆V b there always exist at least one interior stable
steady state. There may exist multiple interior stable steady states.
Proof. See appendix.
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Proposition 3 (ii) confirms the standard result in the literature, namely that if par-
ents promote their own trait and oblique transmission is linear, diversity is guaranteed.
However, this guarantee fails when oblique transmission is biased, since also desired traits
may die out. When the bias is positive or negative, the variant at risk is the one with a
bias against it. It is only when parents who hold that trait attach enough value to it that
there is room for coexistence of the two traits in equilibrium. Intuitively, conformism can
put all minority traits at risk of extinction.
q
∆q Conformism
q
∆q Conformism
q
∆q Negative bias
q
∆q Negative bias
Figure 5. Demand for pluralism. Dynamics under negative bias and conformism.
Figure 5 depicts the cultural dynamics when there is demand for pluralism under
diﬀerent biases in the oblique transmission function. The black (white) squares are the
stable (unstable) steady states. The top panels illustrate the negative bias, and the
bottom panels the conformism. It is evident from this figures that with negative bias
and conformism variants may be at risk, even if there is demand for pluralism. It is also
evident that the cultural dynamics with biased oblique transmission are far more complex
than when linearity is assumed. Recall that when there is demand for pluralism and linear
oblique transmission, there is a unique and interior stable steady state.
We now turn to some comparative statics which analyze how the introduction of biases
changes the main prediction of the standard model of cultural transmission (Bisin and
Verdier, 2001), i.e. existence of a unique stable (interior) steady state. Consider first
panel i) in Figure 6 where the initial dynamics, with linear transmission and demand
for pluralism, are shown by the solid line. As children become negatively biased against
trait a, there is a decrease in the equilibrium proportion of a-agents (dashed line). If the
negative bias becomes strong enough, the population will eventually consists of only b-
types (dotted line). Panel ii) shows how the introduction of conformism turns 0 and
1 which under a linear f are unstable (solid line) into stable steady states. As the
conformism becomes stronger (dotted line) the initial stable interior equilibrium becomes
unstable. For small levels of conformism, though, there may exist an interior stable steady
state (dashed line). As these examples show, changes in the transmission function can
have large eﬀects in the long run distribution of traits.
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q∆q iL
q
∆q iiL
Figure 6. Introduction of i) negative bias and ii) conformism.
It is also worth noting that under demand for pluralism, policies aﬀecting the parents
evaluations may be ineﬀective. Consider Figure 7. In panel i) the solid line represents
the dynamics with negative bias against the a-variant and demand for pluralism, i.e.
∆V b < 0 < ∆V a. Policies aiming at increasing the proportion of a-agents in the population
and that target parents evaluations i.e. increasing ∆V a and ∆V b (dashed line) do not
change qualitatively the dynamics (dotted line). Similarly if the transmission is frequency
dependent as shown in panel ii). If the initial steady state is q = 0, policies which only
target parents evaluations are bound to fail. Reducing the negative bias and the extent
of frequency dependence are more eﬀective in increasing the steady state proportion of
a-agents as it can be seen in Figure 6.
q
∆q iL
q
∆q iiL
Figure 7. Changes in parents evaluation i) with negative bias and ii) with conformism.
V. Conclusion
We have shown that when children evaluate the merit of cultural variants and adopt
culture as a result of interaction with peers, cultural diversity is not guaranteed by a
demand for cultural pluralism on the part of parents. We have also shown that there can
be diversity even if all parents promote the same cultural variant. Furthermore, we show
that the biases in the oblique transmission function than result from merit guided cultural
adoption opens up for multiple stable steady states. Our model, therefore, provides a rich
framework for understanding the underlying driving forces of cultural assimilation and
stratification which modifies the conclusions of previous models of cultural transmission.
Our results provide new interpretations of empirical evidence and new predictions
regarding the eﬀects of integration policies. For instance, it need not be correct to interpret
the disappearance of a cultural variant as resulting from a reversal of parental valuation of
the benefits of holding diﬀerent variants. Our model predicts that a trait can disappear as
a result of integration of a community into another one, not because parents change their
mind about the benefits of variants, but because the composition of peer groups change.
In earlier models of cultural dynamics, even a tiny fraction of families with "bad" habits
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could contaminate a purely "good" neighborhood. When there is conformism, this is no
longer the case. Neither is this the case if children are biased in favor of "good" habits.
Our model also helps us understand the reasons why economically dysfunctional or
otherwise unhealthy cultural variants may persists. In particular, if children are biased in
favour of liking unhealthy food or of taking it easy, or even if they just like to eat what
others eat or shirk as others do, parents of all types, may try in vain to promote good
eating or work habits. It may be the case that, due to diﬀerent initial conditions, in some
communities parents have to put a lot of eﬀort into combatting bad but persistent habits,
while in other communities parents need not worry much.
This paper recognizes that parental ambitions and incentives are indeed important, but
because young individuals are not passive receivers of culture, the processes of assimilation
and stratification are not only up to parents. A natural extension of the present paper
is to model the role of policy makers, and to analyze how parents and policy makers can
influence the biases in the process of oblique transmission.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
GX
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n
¶
qn(1− q)G−n n
G
=
GX
n=1
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qn(1− q)G−n n
G
=
q
GX
n=1
µ
G
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qn−1(1− q)G−n n
G
= q
G−1X
n=0
µ
G− 1
n
¶
qn(1− q)G−1−n = q. (A1)
The last equality follows from the binomial theorem:
TX
n=0
µ
T
n
¶
qnpT−n = (q + p)T . (A2)
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Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 1 it follows that if P (a|n,G) > (<)n/G ∀n then f(q) > (<)q for q ∈
(0, 1).
i) If k = 0 and m¯a = m¯a then P (a|n,G) = nG ∀n and Lemma 1, applies.
ii) Assume now that k 6= 0. P (a|n,G) > n/G whenever
m¯a − m¯b > k(g(
G− n
G
)− g( n
G
)). (A3)
The RHS in (A3) is decreasing in n. P (a|n,G) > n/G ∀n whenever (A3) holds for n = 1.
iii)Assume now that k 6= 0. P (a|n,G) < n/G whenever
m¯a − m¯b < k(g(
G− n
G
)− g( n
G
)). (A4)
The RHS in (A4) is decreasing in n. P (a|n,G) < n/G ∀n whenever (A4) holds for
n = G− 1.
iv) Note first that f 0(0) = G(P (a|1, G) − P (a|0, G)) = GP (a|1, G) and
f 0(1) = G(P (a|1, G)− P (a|G− 1, G) = G(1− P (a|G− 1, G). If
k(g(
1
G
)− g(G− 1
G
)) < m¯a − m¯b < k(g(
G− 1
G
)− g( 1
G
)), (A5)
then P (a|1, G) < 1/G and P (a|G− 1, G) > (G− 1)/G and, f 0(0) < 1,f 0(1) < 1 and there
is a unique q¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that f(q¯) = q¯.
When m¯a = m¯b and k 6= 0, P (a|n,G) = 1− P (a|G− n,G) and since
¡G
n
¢
=
¡ G
G−n
¢
,
f(q) = 1− f(1− q), (A6)
and f(1/2) = 1/2.
Proof of Lemma 2
If ∆V > 0 and q 6= 1, x(q,∆V i) > f(q) and C(x, q) = ca((x − f(q))(1 − f(q))−1). If
follows from c00a > 0 that x(q,∆V ) is increasing in ∆V i. To see this, from the first order
condition we have that
∆V ≡ c0a(
x(q,∆V )− f(q)
1− f(q) )(1− f(q))
−1. (A7)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to ∆V gives:
1 = c00a((x(q,∆V )− f(q))(1− f(q))−1)(1− f(q))−2x∆V (q,∆V ). (A8)
Hence, x∆V (q,∆V ) > 0. To see that x(q,∆V ) is increasing in q, diﬀerentiate the first
order condition with respect to q and rearrange to get:
xq(q,∆V ) = f 0(q)(
1− x(q,∆V )
1− f(q) −
c0a(τa(q,∆V ))
c00a(τa(q,∆V ))
). (A9)
The assumption Cxq(x, q) < 0 implies that the second term in the RHS is positive. Since
f 0(q) > 0, it follows that xq(q,∆V ) > 0. The proof for Lemma 1(ii) is analogous.
16
Proof of Proposition 2
Since ∆V i = ∆V, it follows from (10) that ∆q = (1 − λ)(x(q,∆V ) − q) and ∆q = 0
whenever x(q,∆V ) = q.
i) It follows from the fact that x(1,∆V ) = 1.
ii) Since x(q,∆V ) > f(q) when ∆V > 0 and q < 1 (Lemma 1) then ∆q > 0 whenever
f(q) ≥ q. Evaluating the derivative of ∆q with respect to q at q = 1 we obtain
d(∆q)
dq
|q=1 = (1− λ)(f 0(1)− 1), (A10)
and q = 1 is stable whenever f 0(1) ≤ 1.
iii) At q = 0, ∆q > 0 since x(q,∆V ) > 0. Moreover
d(∆q)
dq
|q=0 = (1− λ)(f 0(0)(1− x(0,∆V )
1
− c
0
a(τa(0,∆V ))
c00a(τa(0,∆V ))
).− 1) < 0. (A11)
At q = 1, ∆q = 0 since x(1,∆V ) = 1. Moreover
d(∆q)
dq
|q=1 = (1− λ)(f 0(1)− 1) > 0. (A12)
Hence, there is a stable interior rest point.
iv) If transmission is frequency dependent, f(q) has three fixed points, q = 0, qˆ, 1. Since
x(0,∆V ) > 0 and lim∆V→0x(q,∆V ) = f(q), for small enough∆V , x(q,∆V ) has also three
fix points, E = {q1(∆V ), q2(∆V ), 1} with lim∆V→0 q1(∆V ) = 0 and lim∆V→0 q2(∆V ) = qˆ.
For large enough ∆V , x(q,∆V ) > q for q < 1 and limt→∞ q(t, q0) = 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
i) If ∆V b < 0 < ∆V a, x(0,∆V b) = 0, x(q,∆V a) = 1 and ∆q = 0 at q = 0, 1.
From (10) and the first order conditions,
∆q = (1−λ)(c0−1a (∆V a(1−f(q)))q(1−f(q))−c0−1b ((−∆V b)f(q))f(q)(1−q)+f−q), (A13)
for ∆V b < 0 < ∆V a. Taking the derivative with respect to q and evaluating at 0 and 1
we obtain:
d(∆q)
dq
|q=0 = (1− λ)(c0−1a (∆V a) + f 0(0)− 1), (A14)
d(∆q)
dq
|q=1 = (1− λ)(c0−1b (−∆V b) + f 0(1)− 1). (A15)
It is easy to see that:
a) f 0(0) ≥ 1⇒ d(∆q)dq eq=0 > 0 and f 0(0) < 1, d(∆q)dq eq=0 T 0 when c0−1a (∆V a) T 1−f 0(0).
b) f 0(1) ≥ 1 ⇒ d(∆q)dq eq=1 > 0 and f 0(1) < 1, d(∆q)dq eq=1 T 0 when c0−1b (−∆V b) T
1− f 0(1).
ii) That q = 0, 1 are unstable follows from i, a) and i, b) . Since c0−1a (∆V a(1− q)) is
decreasing in q and c0−1b ((−∆V b)q) is increasing there is a unique interior rest point q∗.
Stability follows from the fact that c0−1a (∆V a(1− q)) T c0−1b ((−∆V b)q) whenever q S q∗.
iii)-v) follows from i, a) and i, b).
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